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Abstract
This paper is an introduction to a study of what 4,000 Israelis had to say about their leisure, culture, and
communication. In a national survey conducted during the spring of 1970, we gathered data on a large variety
of cultural activities. With respect to each of them, an effort was made to measure both supply and demand.
Thus, we know for cultural events taking place outside the home which events were advertised where, and we
know who attends which activities. Likewise, we studied the cultural activities that take place inside the home,
paying particular attention to the effect of the introduction of television, and to the fate of the book the newest
and oldest media in Israel. We try to do this within two broader contexts. One is behavioural: using the
method of time-budget analysis, we have reconstructed the way in which Israelis invest time, that most scarce
of human resources, over the 24-hour period of a weekday, a Friday, and a Saturday. The other context is that
of attitudes and values: we discuss the functions of cultural activities and communications within the
framework of attitudes towards work, leisure, the Sabbath, and holidays, and more generally, in terms of the
social and psychological 'needs' that are experienced as salient by Israeli Jews, in their several social roles.
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CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION 
IN ISRAEL: 
THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF TRADITION 
Elihu Katz 
T HIS paper is an int.rodu. ction to a study of what 4,000 Israelis had to say about their leisure, culture, and communication. In a national survey conducted during the spring of 1970, we 
gathered data on a large variety of cultural activities.' With respect to 
each ofthem, an effort was made to measure both supply and demand. 
Thus, we know-for cultural events taking place outside the home-
which events were advertised where, and we know who attends which 
activities. Likewise, we studied the cultural activities that take place 
inside the home, paying particular attention to the effect of the intro-
duction of television, and to the fate of the book_the newest and oldest 
media in Israel. We try to do this within two broader contexts. One is 
behavioural: using the method of time-budget analysis, we have re-
constructed the way in which Israelis invest time, that most scarce of 
human resources, over the 24-hour period of a weekday, a Friday, and a 
Saturday. The other context is that of attitudes and values: we discuss 
the functions of cultural activities and communications within the 
framework of attitudes towards work, leisure, the Sabbath, and holidays, 
and more generally, in terms of the social and psychological 'needs' 
that are experienced as salient by Israeli Jews, in their several social 
roles. 
Since facts never speak for themselves, we sought to find a way of 
presenting this huge array of detailed data as a meaningful whole. 
Three quite different approaches suggested themselves, of which we 
rejected two and adopted the third. 
Three approaches to ordering the data 
One approach would have been to report on Israel as a small state 
with modest but essentially modern patterns ofleisure and culture. We 
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can demonstrate that Israelis are not very different from the British, for' 
example, in the proportion of the population who are outside their, 
homes on a weekday evening, or in the number of books they read; and 
not so different from the French in the time they spend caring for child-, 
reno A good case can be made for the contention that modern societies 
are becoming homogeneous in their patterns of spending leisure, and 
that Israel-for all its ostensible difference-is moving in the same 
general direction. 2 , 
Another way in which these findings might have been summed up is: 
in terms of changes which are believed by some to be taking place in: 
Israeli society today. Thus, it has become routine for journalists, some' 
of whom are sensitive observers, to find materialism and pleasure-
seeking on the increase in Israel; they suggest that officials and business; 
men are more corruptible than before; they find more aimlessness and' 
crime; they say tension among ethnic groups is increasing; they argue 
that there is a desensitizing to human suffering; and they find that the 
interdependence of the Jewish people is a matter of decreasing concern 
to young Israelis. 3 
We have rejected both those approaches. The first seems to us 
excessively behaviouristic and too matter-of-fact; it ignores nothing 
less than the long saga from which Israel arose, the short and dramatic 
history of its nation-building, and the imprint of both of these-: 
Judaism and Zionism-upon its culture. To say, in behaviouristic' 
zeal, that it resembles other small European states is to ignore its 
idiosyncratic meaning: where it has come from, what it is about, and '. 
the choices that lie before it.4 
We have rejected the second approach because, while it has time; 
perspective and is concerned with values, it is too near-sighted. It is: 
based on a too facile romanticization of the recent past, very selectively! ' 
recalled. It is based on the behaviour of very small groups and onl 
sensational cases. Perhaps some of these indictments are correct. Indeed,: 
our own data do give some support-though far less dramatically-to! 
some of the allegations; for example, we find that Israeli youth are, 
somewhat less convinced than their parents of the mutual dependence: 
of the Jews in Israel and abroad. But this is a far cry from the radical i 
changes tha,t are alleged, and a finding that is counter-balanced by the i 
essential similarity which characterizes the Israel-born generation and 1 
its parents even in this matter. Altogether, as we shall argue, we find 
very little evidence of a generation gap. Perhaps today's exceptional 
and sensational will at some future time prove to be the rule; perhaps 
the sensibilities of to day's minorities are portents of those of tomorrow's ' 
majorities. 5 But for the moment, and in the absence of serious and much- ' 
needed longitudinal studies oflsraeli values, we demur. We shall be un-
able to say that we were not warned. 
We have chosen a third way. The story in our data, we think, is 
6 
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neither one of small-nation normality nor of drastic demoralization, but 
of the transformation and secularization of tradition. Our thesis, in a 
word, is tbat the predominant patterns ofleisure and culture in modern 
Israel are anchored in a set of traditionalJ ewish values which are under-
going a process of transformation. It might be better to say that these 
data describe both the ways in which Israeli society has incorporated 
traditional values in its rapid evolution, and the ways in which those 
values are transformed in the course of their secularization. 6 Perhaps the 
end result will be normality and/or demoralization, but in the mean-
time, it is important to see and understand the process that is at work. 
The concept of secularization 
Secularization is presumably one of the attributes of modernization. 
Nowadays, however, some observers are not so sure; others would 
grant only tbat life has become more compartmentalized, and that 
certain institutions are governed by sacred and others by secular, 
norms.7 All agree, however, that the concept has been used in a variety 
of ways and merits clarification; one writer has even pleaded for a 
moratorium on its use. 8 
To apply the concept of secularization to Judaism is even more 
problematic because Judaism, from the beginning, was suffused with 
secular elements. It is, first of all, a national religion, albeit with a 
universalistic God and a universalistic ethic. It is, moreover, preoccupied 
with history, making it all the more difficult to decide, for example, 
which elements of which holidays are sacred or secular. Indeed, its over-
all strategy is to sanctify the secular, .not in the sense of mystification 
but in the sense of giving" religious significance to the round of everyday 
life. It is a religious culture which emphasizes observance and form, 
perhaps more than belief. Nevertheless, if the society and values of 
modern Israel are viewed against the backdrop of the traditionalJ ewish 
society of not so long ago, some meaningful comparisons can be 
made. 
It is in this sense that we find the concept of secularization applicable 
to the situation we want to portray. Sometimes; we refer to the secu-
larization of form but contim;Iity of traditional consciousness-as in the 
transformation of the age-old longing for a return to Zion into the 
business of irrigating deserts and electing parliaments. 9 Sometimes, we 
refer to the secularization of consciousness but continuity of form-as 
the re-infusion of nationalistic and naturalistic meaning into religious 
holidays. In either case, there appears (at first glance) considerable 
continuity with traditional Jewish values. In fact, however, the process 
of secular transformation, while preserving external forms or internal 
meanings, is sometimes subversive of that which it purports to main-
tain,lO 
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The themes which seem central to this framework are the following: 
(I) the traditional collectivity-orientation of the Jewish people, as, 
opposed to the primacy of individual self-interest; 
(2) the traditional centrality of the nuclear family; 
(3) the traditional idea that the content of leisure-and, indeed, the 
entire round oflife-is normatively prescribed rather than that one 
is free 'to do one's own thing'; , 
(4) the traditional conception of 'the chosen people' and its re-
appearance in Zionist thought as a 'spiritual centre' for Jewish 
and humanistic creativity; 
(5) the traditional qualities 'of asceticism (sobriety) and reality-
orientation as opposed to hedonism and free-floating fantasy. 
I. Collectivity-orientation 
It is a nice paradox that the establishment of modern nationhood 
was probably easier-psychologically speaking-for the Jews than for' 
the embryonic nations that were living on their own soil. Jewish 
nationalism did not have the difficult task of overcoming loyalties to 
village and region that stood in the way of the unification of other 
nations. Jewish loyalties always reached beyond the local community to ' 
regional, national, and international alliances with other Jewish com-
munities everywhere, all of which shared the memory of the collective 
national experience in the past and of its promised renewal in the future. ' 
It was easy to adapt this image to the conceptions of European national-
ism. 
It hardly needs an elaborate empirical study to establish that the 
materialization of this dream is at hand; 'To feel pride that we have a 
state' tops a list of 35 personal, social, and other 'needs' presented for: 
evaluation to the sample of respondents.!I Similarly, of all the holidays: 
about which we enquired, Yom Haatzmaut (Independence Day) is the' 
one which holds meaning for everybody-young and old, religious and; 
irreligious, educated and uneducated, Western and Oriental immigrants ' 
-while Yom Kippur, by comparison, is alleged to have 'no meaning for: 
me' by 16 per cent of the respondents. Again, the 'readiness to sacrifice 
oneself Tor the national ideals'-which was associated in our question 
with the traditional concept of kiddush haShem (sanctification of the 
Name )-is adjudged one of the most characteristic of contemporary , 
national traits by religious and irreligious alike. 
The nation is united not only by the fact of the State and not alone by 
the memory of the collective experience oflong ago, but by more recent 
experience as well. The Holocaust of European Jewry preoccupies a 
majority of the popUlation; the extent of reading on this subject is 
widespread, and there is disquiet lest something like it happen again. It 
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is true that this concern is more characteristic of older persons and 
of Ashkenazim, but it is a matter of no small COncern to younger people 
and Oriental immigrants as well. 
The feeling of connexion with Jews abroad is strong. The feeling that 
those Jews are spiritually dependent upon Israel is shared by all seg-
ments of the population. The feeling that Israelis, in turn, are depen-
dent on Diaspora Jewry is also strong, but younger people are less 
likely than their parents to agree to that. 
Israelis see little difference between their identities as Jews and as 
Israelis. Whereas Professor Herman, in Israelis and Jews, finds that 
religion is a component of Israeli identity only for religious but not for 
irreligious Israelis, the present study finds that the same holds true for 
Jewish identity.l2 That is, non-religious Israelis find it possible to main-
tain their identity as Jews (not just as Israelis) without making room 
for religion. For a significant proportion of the population, in other 
words, the religious element has been subtracted from both Jewish and 
Israeli identities, whereas it is present in both sets of identities for 
religious persons. Indeed, it appears that the two sets of identities are 
virtually synonymous. For all its contribution to integration of the 
society, here are first warnings concerning the consequences of a facile 
transformation of the traditional collectivity orientation of the Jewish 
people into the typical forms and symbols of nationhood. We shall see 
the manifestation of this problem again in the discussion of the trans-
formation of traditional holidays. 
We find very little evidence of a generation gap. The young hold 
values and attitudes similar to those of their parents-that is, the statisti-
cal distribution of the opinions and attitudes and behaviour of youth 
with respect to almost any issue is almost exactly like that of the parent 
generation." Where the young and their parents differ, each party 
knows exactly where the other stands; there is no confusion about the 
fact that the parents are somewhat more ascetic and that the young 
are more present-oriented and say they have a stronger sense of social 
justice! 
The lines along which the population in fact divides are educational 
and religious. Education is generally much stronger than ethnicity, 
with people of different ethnic backgrounds acting and thinking simi-
larly, given similar educational attainments. Of course, 'holding edu-
cation constant', as we say, is easy to do statistically; but it ought not to 
blind us to the fact that the educational gap is still very wide. Religion 
stands out as potentially the sharpest dividing line in the society. 
Religious people-while concentrated in the lower educational groups 
-not only differ in their outlook and behaviour on many things; they 
are also more solidary among themselves than is the non-religious popu-
lation. The educated religious person is in the vanguard in upholding 
values and practices which have a bearing on the religious outlook. 
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Religious identification, however, does not in any way conflict with 
national identification. The religious groups in our sample (some 
extremists are under-represented) are, if anything, more Zionist than the 
non-religious. 
How are these integrative tendencies represented in the institutions 
of culture and leisure? For one' thing, people rely very heavily on the 
newspaper, on the radio, and on television to feel close to whatis going on. 
These are the media of involvement with state and society, and they are 
very heavily used for that purpose. The newspaper is the medium par 
excellence in this respect. Again, the shared experience of the Holocaust 
and the Six-Day War-both actual events and the reporting of them-
symbolize the common fate. The reading of books on those two subjects 
has cut across all the dividing lines of the society. 
Second, we are impressed that internal tourism (the tiyul) is a major 
integrating mechanism. There is a very large amount of travelling' 
within the country-more than two-thirds of the population have 
visited Caesaria, Hebron, Tsfat, and the Negev: three-quarters have' 
visited a kibbutz, and half have been to the Israel Museum. Even if 
tiyul may not be a Zionist invention (curiously Jacob Katz, in Tradition' 
and Crisis, suggests that it was popular even in eastern Europe before 
emancipation 14), there seems little doubt that the people meet one: 
another on the road and at historical and national sites. 
The holidays are also major integrating events. As we shall note-
below, most of them are still very alive not only for religious persons, 
but for the irreligious as well. 
Finally, there is a strong trend towards homogenization in the con- . ;' 
sumption of culture in the country. More explicitly, if one compares a) 
person with eight years' schooling in Dimona with a person of like, 
education in Tel Aviv, the odds are very high that each will have been. 
-to the theatre, to the cinema, on a tiyul, etc., with about the same 
frequency. It is also very likely-though we did not investigate this 
specifically-that they saw the same films and plays and visited the-
same sites. This is quite remarkable in view of the great disparity of 
cultural offerings between large and small towns; it does not mean that: 
Dimona or similar towns are content; they are not. Their residents 
CGmplain of inadequate facilities and 'unsuitable companionship'. 
Moreover, the proportion of well-educated people is much smaller in . 
the development towns than in Tel Aviv, and one should beware-we 
caution again----of generalizations based upon 'holding education con- . 
stant'. Nevertheless, the homogeneity of cultural consumption-edu-_ 
cation being held constant-is remarkable. And, of course, this homo-' 
geneity is further abetted by national radio and television broadcasting 
and a national press. The two afternoon papers are read by 69 per cent 
of the population. 
10 
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2. Familism 
An equally familiar trait of Jewish civilization is dedication to the 
family, and to the extended family as well. The data from this study 
shoW that the family is at the centre of the society's conception of it-
self," The need 'to spend time with my family' is next in importance 
. to the pride in having a state. 
These are not mere expressions of values or of attitudes. Familism 
is expressed in action. Three-quarters of those adults whose parents 
are alive visit them at least once a week, and parents report visiting 
their married children with equal frequency! 16 Education and social 
class make almost no difference here; unlike other societies, a higher 
degree of education, if anything, increases the frequency of visits. 
One has the impression that Israelis-despite or because of the up-
rooted character of the society-are very sensitive to familial continuity: 
a large majority of the population feel that they have a good idea of 
how life was lived in grandfather's house.17 
Household duties do not seem to be a heavy burden for Israelis; 
familism is not expressed, apparently, in house-cleaning. On the other 
hand, the time de\ioted to care for children is high compared with most 
other nations.IS 
When people are asked to imagine what they would do with an 
extra day ofleisure if the five-day working-week came to pass, by far the 
most frequent answer is: 'I would spend the time with my family'. That 
. a man 'should' so spend most of his leisure time is affirmed by 71 per cent 
of the respondents. 
How does the family spend its time? What cultural activities bind it 
together? Of the mass media, television contributes most to family 
solidarity; households spend an average of about two hours around the 
television set every night. Television is rather less effective in keeping at 
home adolescents and young adults, or those of higher education; . 
Other activities that go on inside the home are more particularized: 
reading, hobbies, listening to records, study. Radio listening has also 
become a much more private affair since the advent of the transistor 
and the introduction of television. All these activities increase with 
increased educati6n. Indeed, the culture of the home is primarily a 
function of education (whereas the selection of activities outside the 
home is governed at least as much by age). The less educated spend more 
of their leisure sleeping or resting or looking after their home. 
Far more important than television as a focus for family solidarity 
are Saturdays and holidays. The Sabbath is the day which families 
spend together: it is the day for visiting, for more leisurely meals. For 
the religious, it is the day of prayer and rest. For the non-religious, it is a 
day for family trips and house-cleaning. 
A clear majority of the population want to preserve the quiet, 
II 
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homely character of the Sabbath eve as it exists today in Israel. This holds 
equally true for young and old. On the other hand, when asked more 
explicitly whether public transport should operate on the Sabbath and 
whether theatres, concert halls, and cinemas should be open, they are, 
rather less traditional in their response. Still, even here, there is a clea~ 
differentiation between more 'cultural' activity-such as community 
centres and theatres-and the cinema, for example. Far fewer (abouti, 
40 per cent) are in favour of opening the cinemas on Friday night. While: 
the scriptural definition of the Sabbath is by no means the guiding, 
ideal, it is obvious that there is a 'cultural' ideal that is shared by a good' 
part of the population. (Only the stoutly irreligious among the well· 
educated want a drastic change in the character of the Sabbath eve.), 
Once more it should be said that while there are clear signs of cultural' 
continuity here, one should not make the mistake of assuming that 
no changes are at work: a drive in the family car, or playing chamber 
music, or watching television (however cultured the content of those 
activities) is not what our forbears had in mind for the Sabbath. 
Still another sign of the commitment to family and tradition in 
connexion with the Sabbath is in the preference expressed for Friday, 
rather than Sunday or another weekday, f01'the second free day of the 
desired five-day work-week. The preference for Friday-from the point 
of view of the quality of the culture--will have very different conse· 
quences, if adopted, from that of a Saturday-Sunday weekend. The 
Friday-Saturday weekend implies a day of 'preparation'-as Friday is: 
today-for the following Holy Day, while the Saturday..sunday week-
end provides for tension-release at the conclusion of the Holy Day. 
Saturday night is now the popular night for going out, but there is a 
higher risk of anomie and its accompanying malaise if it is to be followed' 
by a day which is normatively unstructured. The questions of CI) 
whether an extra day? (2) which day?, and (3) what provisions will be 
made for cultural activities on the extra day? are major questions for' 
cultural policy-makers. ' 
3. Normative prescriptions for spending leisure 
Traditional Jewish culture, like nature, did not tolerate a vacuum. It 
sanctified activities governing the entire round of life--not merely 
prayer-time or rites de passage but eating-time, sleepingCtime, and 
leisure-time. It is another one of those nice-sounding paradoxes to say' 
that the Jews invented leisure (in .the institution of the Sabbath) and 
then took it back again (by minute prescriptions on how to spend it). 
Indeed, leisure was not left at all to the individual's discretion on week-
days either; normatively, his every moment-and all the more so ifhe 
could free himself from work-was to be devoted to sacred study. Like 
other norms, this one was not easy to live up to" but people were well 
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ware of the fact, and they made the attempt. Nor is there reason to ~ink that it was experienced as oppressive; quite the contrary. More-
ver as with other aspects of Jewish religious strategy, certain things ~hat' people wanted to do-like getting up parties, for example-were 
subsumed and legitimated in terms of the halakha in the same way as the 
things they had to do-such as eating. Thus parties could be legitimately 
given on certain occasions-such as when group-study of a book of the 
Talmud was completed, or on certain holidays; then the party became 
a mitzva and was not considered mere frivolity organized at the expense 
of study.I9 And days off from work (and study) were called holidays, 
, and each of them was a legitimation of leisure too. 
The modern secular city is at the opposite pole. Its ideal,type, at any 
rate, makes available the widest variety of individual choice to suit all 
tastes and proclivities. And modern leisure, the dominant voices say, is a 
time for individual self-expression. 
Israel (like most other countries) is in-between, t!:tough it is probably 
on the more traditional side also here. First of all, there is a six-day 
working-week-which obviously spares the society the problem of 
deciding what to do with a non-normatively prescribed leisure day. 
Moreover, in so far as people can foresee how they would spend 
another eventual free day, they do not have very radical ideas. Most 
would spend more time with their families; some would rest; some would 
engage in household duties; others would take trips. The main thrust 
of most of these replies is that people would do more of, or better with, 
the roles to which they are already committed. Most of the extra leisure 
would be spent close to, or inside, the home. It is interesting that reading 
is .ahead of any of the arts or the media in the list of things people say 
they would do with more time. 
The 'need for rest appears to be particularly acute for some elements 
of the population: the working woman, first of all; then people employed 
in commerce, workers in building, in industry, and in service occu-
'pations. They are all tired; and want a five-day week. Agricultural 
workers are tired too, but they are not enthusiastic about a shortened 
week since they would not benefit much from' it and might only feel 
deprived when others were free. Those with low incomes are also tired, 
and are also unenthusiastic (relatively) about a shortened work-week-
perhaps because they fear reduced earnings, or perhaps because they 
have little idea of the potentialities ofleisure. While these groups are the 
more likely to relate leisure and rest, the equation ofleisure and respite 
and ofleisure and privacy (or familism) is predominantly emphasized 
by almost all groups. It is important to stress that while physical rest 
certainly figures in the traditional conception of leisure, so do its sacred 
and public aspects: the Sabbath, in the tradition, is a day of 'rest .and 
sanctity'; and it is a day of assembly-for festive prayer and study. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the idea of spending leisure in public, 
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and of devoting it to collective rather than private pursuits, also under-
lies the concept of political participation in a democracy. It is not only 
Jewish ideals that require the normative and public use of leisure for! 
their fulfilment. But the trend, overall, is towards privatization. 
The preference for normatively prescribed leisure rather than for do-
your-own-thing leisure is shown in the attitudes ofIsraelis towards public 
holidays. The traditional holidays, in general, continue to have meaning 
for persons who are not religious. Unlike New Year's Eve or the First of 
May, for example, the Holy Days of Purim, Passover, Rosh Hashana, 
Hanukka-and even Shavuot or Lag Ba-omer-have retained their 
meaningfulness for most people. As in the case of the Sabbath, these are, 
not the original meanings: the latter have been somewhat transformed: 
by elevating familial, historical, natural, and other aspects of the 
holidays to primary positions. Thus Passover becomes a holiday whose, 
primary meaning for many is to provide a feeling of connexion with past 
generations and with history, while Shavuot connects them to changing' 
seasons, and so on. They might have answered (as some in fact did) that 
the holiday had no meaning for them; or that it was a day for rest or for' 
doing what they pleased; but they did not so answer. On the other hand,' 
as many as ,6 per cent said that Yom Kippur had 'no meaning for me': 
-probably because it is incapable of undergoing secular transformation;, 
it is not a day on which one can go out for a picnic, or even celebrate: 
national or social emancipation. It is a Holy Day for which Jewish 
tradition provides no other alternative to personal confrontation with, 
God. 
To a certain degree, unprescribed leisure time is made available to: 
young people. They go out often, and engage in a variety of activities 
involving friends, the cinema, and light entertainment. Their going out 
is probably more aimless than the outings of their elders. Even in the 
case of young people, however, there is an important need to feel that 
leisure is being spent constructively. 
But what of the classic prescription to employ leisure time for study? 
Here again, we have an example of the secular transformation of a 
traditional concept. Relatively to other countries, Israelis spend more of 
their leisure-time reading books. Compared with the countries of West-: 
ern Europe, a larger proportion of Israelis read at least one book last, 
year, and more are 'active readers' (eight books or more per year). The 
proportion of 'active readers' among all readers is about as high as in' 
England and the Scandinavian countries, and is somewhat higher. 
when looked at as a proportion of the population as a whole. 20 ' 
Perhaps, therefore, the Israelis still deserve the title of the People of 
the Book (an appellation given to Jews and Christians by dIe Prophet: 
Muhammad). Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the: 
classical conception of the People of the Book and the secular transfor- ' 
mation of that concept. 
'4 
CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION IN ISRAEL 
'The traditional idea of the Book is that an entire people is simultan-
Dusly-indeed, almost continuously-occupied with the same set of 
eymbols and metaphors in terms of which their society and their per-
~eption of th: world is .organized. The Book is t~e source of rules, and 
the constitutIOn by whIch all members-leaders mcluded-are bound. 
It is an ongoing collective creation, to which each generation contri-
butes. The secular transformation of the concept, People of the Book, is 
people of books, or people of reading; something quite different, obvi-
ously. There is nothing shared about the experience any more. Reading 
is now a private experience and everybody is reading a different book. 
'There is no little irony in the fact that something of the collective 
experience w~!ch once der!ve.dfrom the Book.is now to be. had f;om 
viewing televlSlon, for a maJonty of the populatIOn spend theIr evemngs 
tuned to Israel's one channel. In this sense, television is more like the 
original conception of the Book than are books! But 'Mission Impossible' 
is no match for Genesis. 
4. Chosenness 
Book-reading relates, in turn, to the conception of a 'spiritual centre', 
which is a modem transformation of the concept of 'chosenness'. When 
asked, 'Do you think Israel should be more actively engaged in culture 
and learning than other nations?' , 70 per cent said yes. There is some 
reason to believe that they mean it. Not only are there more readers 
than in other countries, but there are also more people who study (as 
many as a third study regularly-on their own, or with teachers). They 
express a strong interest in the possibility of formal study-and not 
necessarily for credit or degrees. They say that radio and television 
might be used~ for this purpose, even at the expense of prime-time 
programming. Indeed, judging from the response to this proposal, if 
television were to devote one night a week to courses in adult education, 
there is a good likelihood that the new programme would be well 
received. But the emphasis of adults is not on instrumental career-
oriented learning; it is on learning for learning's sake. People say they 
want that: why not believe them? 
The argument that adult education via television requires another 
channel because the present one is 'full', is based on the assumption 
that 'Family Affair' and 'Bewitched' and 'The Saint' are the kinds 
of programme people will not do without-indeed, they say they are 
satisfied with them~but they do not want more ofthem. What they do 
want more of, however, is home-made Israeli programmes-in prefer-
ence to the technically superior imported ones. And for the same reason 
they are enthl.lsiastic about Israeli-made films: the loyalty to the 
Hebrew-speaking cinema is remarkably high. 
That is not the case, however, for original Hebrew books. While 
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_time spent at work or at leisure, the former out-distanced the latter 
by far-although the proportion answering that 'both' work and leisure 
were important is higher still. Altogether, the characterization of 
Israeli society as 'puritan' seems not too far off the mark. On the other 
hand, the high percentage who feel that luck is a major component of 
success, and the high proportion of participation in the several national 
lotteries argue in another direction. Nor is high productivity or pride in 
work-attributes which were not explicitly examined by us-especially 
conspicuous to the observer of this society, Still, orientation to reality 
and a general sense of sobriety and of purpose appear to be.important 
basic values. 
6. Conclusion 
The threads of continuity are still clearly visible in Israeli culture. 
The Jewish values of collectivity-orientation, familism, learning, sense 
of purpose, and orientation to reality are all much in evidence. Some 
of these values seem to have remained intact. Others are undergoing 
transformation. Thus, the People of the Book have become the people of 
reading; the religious festival is transformed in meaning; ethnicity and 
national identification appear to be dominating religious integration. 
In all this, the generation gap does not seem much in evidence-
although there are some differences. The young (18-25 years old in our 
study) feel less dependent on DiasporaJewry; their thoughts turn less 
often to the Holocaust; they seek more immediate gratification as 
compared with the future-orientation of their parents; they may be 
. somewhat less religious. But on the whole they are not very much 
different-and will be even less so, one suspects, when they grow older. 
The big question is whether the transformation will prfserve any 
semblance of the uniqueness of traditional Jewish culture. What will 
become of Yom Kippur, if secular Jews find difficulty in investing it 
with a transformed meaning? What will become of religious holidays 
that have-once again-returned to nature, family, and nation (whence 
they arose)? What will happen to the tradition of learning if it is 
oriented towards individualistic rather than collective experience, and 
to career rather than .to learning for its own sake? Will the sense of 
peoplehood become standardized patriotism? Will chosenness become 
mere chauvinism? These are some of the major questions raised by this 
study. . 
Another set of problems is concerned with artistic and cultural 
creativity- in a small nation" bent on reviving an ancient culture in a 
modern world. Will the satellite leave room for indigenous expression 
On the airwaves? Will the book written locally and in Hebrew hold its 
own against the avalanche of translated foreign works? Will the nascent 
Israeli film have a chance against the sub-titled films of Hollywood? 
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Indeed, will traditional Holy Days survive the electronic transmission of 
other people's celebrations? Will Judaism survive Zionism? 
All these matters require policy decisions. There is no use evading the 
fact that the Government is actively involved in cultural policy: it 
subsidizes some theatres; it gives tax rebates to some films; it organizes 
the Independence Day celebrations; it does not concern itself with the 
high cost of books; it makes the public performance of Richard Strauss 
very difficult; and so on. Cultural policy, however, is rarely made ex-
plicit. The Ministry of Education and Culture is only now beginning to, 
live up to the latter part of its name. Public discussion of the issues de- . 
serves to be encouraged. 
At the same time, the education of the consumer of culture needs to be 
cultivated. Learning how to view a television programme, or how to 
read a newspaper is one aspect of this; pondering the contemporary 
meaning of traditional holidays is another. Contemplating how-or 
whether-to give expression to the national quest for moral purpose is 
still another. Adult education-in its broadest sense-is the challenge 
of Israeli culture. It is, potentially, also the most important link with the 
kind of continuing education which was the most distinctive aspect of . 
. traditional Jewish culture. Thought and resources must be made' 
available for its cultivation. 
NOTES 
1 The study on which this paper is hased was commissioned by the late 
Zalrn.an kanne, when Minister of Education and Culture; it was carried out 
jointly by the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University and the 
Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Members of the research group 
were Elihu Katz and Michael Gurevitch (co-directors), and Hanna Adoni, 
Gila Brand, Oved Cohen, Hadassah Haas, and Leah Isaac. This paper 
constitutes the second of two introductory chapters to the report on the study 
by Katz and Gurevitch which is being published by :Faber and Faber 
(London) and, to the volume in Hebrew, by Am Oved (Tel Aviv). Empirical 
data referred to here are documented in those works. The present version of 
the paper was prepared for presentation at the Symposium on 'Israel Society' 
organized by the Institute of Jewish Affairs in London, 18 March 1973, and 
benefited from the discussion of participants and panellists. It was written 
while I was Simon Research Fellow at the University of Manchester. 
2 For a persuasive argument that students of leisure focus too much on 
national and sub-group differences and too little on the similar rhythms of 
modern societies, see Kenneth Roberts, L8isure, London, 1970. 
3 In fact, the collection of our data pre-dates much of this criticism. This is 
of some import in as much as it is the relative decline in concern over security 
problems which is blamed for some of these alleged changes. This is another 
possible reason why our data do not reflect them (or why we did not focus on 
them as directly as we might have done, if our study were being designed 
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t day). It is certainly true that a decline in the preoccupation with security b~ing5 the domestic proble~s of social a,nd economic re~ati~ns to the fore;, 
Israel w~ll have to grapple wIth these. It IS also true that In CIrcumstances of 
stensible calm the newspapers have more room, and more time, to put these 
o ., d 
roblems on SOcIety sagen a. 
p 4 This is the objection to all purely behavioural analysis, of course, whether 
ofIGnsey-typestudies of human sexual behaviour or of behavioural studies of 
the uses of time where one kind of act is equated with another so long as they 
consume the same amount of time. There is much to be learned from such 
data, however; indeed, as noted above, a considerable part of our own 
analysis is based on such material. But, clearly, they are not 'sufficient'. 
5 Survey research, based on random sampling, gives every respondent an 
equal vote .. It is now well known that radical social change is not usually 
accomplished by a majority vote. Professor S. J. Gould of Nottingham 
University, in a private conversation after the Symposium, suggested that our 
analysis reminded him of sociological analyses of American society on _ the 
eve of the violent racial, urban, and student upheavals of the 1960s. Even if 
such a fate is in store for Israel, it is important to say that, even today, as the 
smoke is dying down, the vast majority of the American people are not very 
different from what they were, nor did the much .. vaunted generation gap 
affect more than only a fraction of the college-educated youth. But this is 
not to gainsay the importarice of the social crisis in America. Methodologi-
cally, it suggests that several parallel lines of social inquiry must be carried 
out at the same time, and with different populations, and that each of these 
lines of investigation niust be continued over time. . 
6 We are sidestepping the question of how Israeli culture and leisure are 
different from those of Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Clearly, the 
process of secularizati0rt in Judaism did not begin with Israel, or even 
with Zionism. And the tension between ethnicity and religion has mark~d 
the history of modern Jewish thought not only for the irreligious but for 
the religious aswell; indeed, this is part of what Reform Judaism was (is?) 
all about: We ask forgiveness of those who would have liked us-to face this 
larger question head on. We hope, none the less, that this portrait of Israel will 
contribute to the-larger discussion, in which the role of Israel-as the Jewish 
state-features so prominently. 
'l See, for example, Andrew Greeley, The Denominational Society, New York, 
1972. 
8 David Martin, The Religious and the Secular, London, 1969. See especially 
Chapter I, 'Towards -Eliminating the Concept of Secularisation', and 
Chapter 4, 'Secularisation: The Range of Meaning'. 
9 The distinction b~t\.veen secularization of social structure and of con-
sciousness is Peter Berger's in The New Reality of Religion, London, 1968. In 
discussing 'Israelite religion', Berger tends to see the Jews as demystifiers of 
primitive religions ariel hence as having a secularizing influence from the 
beginning. Our outlook is rather different, as noted above. 
10 Here we disagree with writers like Andrew Greeley who argue that 
secularization is not rampant in modern society and that the sacred and the 
traditional are holding their own, at least as well as in earlier societies. For 
the case WE; reported, the evidence of the continuity of tradition is there to be 
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seen; indeed, that is the point of this paper. But the process of secularization 
and its ultimate subversion of the sacred seems equally apparent. One can 
remember what Passover used to be like in one's parents' home, and, re~ 
enacting its forms, infuse it with secular -meanings. But even if the result can 
be institutionalized, one cannot transmit this process to another generation: 
that is the problem. 
11 These 'needs" or goals or values are derived from the literature on the 
functions of mass communications for self and society, supplemented by 
'needs' w.hich seemed to us particularly characteristic of the Israeli scene, 
Respondents were asked to say, with respect to each, how ~important' it 
-was. 
12 Simon Herman, Israelis and Jews, New York, I970' 
13 Here we differ with Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons, New 
York, I97I. We did not explore attitudes to the stereotype of the Diaspora : 
Jew, though the generation gap in this respect might be more likely to exist 
between our first generation and their parents rather than with their children. 
As for attitudes to Arabs, we find that' the important differences are far 
better explained by education than age: the,_ better educated, at any age, are' 
more open to friendship with Arabs. Further support for the absence of a 
conspicuous generation gap can be found:, the last elections revealed no' 
differences in the voting patterns of younger and older voters. 
14 Jacob Katz, ,Tradition and Crisis, -New York, I961. -
15 This use of 'centre' is more than rhetorical. Using a technique for the 
mapping of matrices of inter-correlations (the Guttman-Lingoes method of 
Smallest Space Analysis), we find family at the centre of the map. This 
means, essentially, that the magnitude of the correlations between commit-
ment to family and a large variety of otherWise disparate values is equally 
high. 
16 Cf. Bert Adams, Kinship in an Urban Setting, Chicago, 1967, and Michael 
"young and Peter Wilmott, Fa(niiYand KJnshipiw East London, London, 
Penguin edn., I968. A recomputation of the figures in these volumes on the 
fr~quency of meetings between adult ,'pa'reri~s':-and' married children suggests 
thatthe Israeli rate is very high, even when compared with the small Southern 
city studied by Adams or the family-liased networks studied by Young and 
Wilmott. . 
17 This is one of the points at which a comparison between second- and 
third-generation Israelis and their cousins in the United States might be 
very revealing. One has the impression that -immigrants to America did not 
give their children much of a picture of what life was like in their parents' 
home in eastern Europe, whereas Israelis of- the _-same origin have a clearer 
picture. However, this is just a guess-and eminently-worth studying, though 
the picture grows cloudier with each new fiddl~r on each romantic roof. 
, 18 References to the comparative use of tiine· are all based on Alexander 
Szalai, ed., The Use qf Time, The Hague, '972 • 
19 See Jacob Katz, op. cit., for a discussion of such phenomena. 
,,20 Statistics on books and rea,ding abo:und; hut they are not always easily 
comparable, being based on differing definitions and methods of research. 
Data in the table below are from the Reader's Digest Association, Survey of 
Europe Today, London, '970, pp. 120-21;: they are from specially com-
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missioned sample surveys in each of the countries listed, and the methods 
employed were similar to Ours. For further details em reading in Israel, see 
Elihu Katz and Hanna Adoni, 'Function of the Book for Society and Self', in 
Diogenes (forthcoming) and in Kalma Yaron, ed., Lifelong Education in Israel, 
Association for Adult Education, Jerusalem 1972, as well as a Master~s;_thesis 
by Mrs. Adoni submitted to the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew 
University, '972 (in Hebrew). 
Readers of books and readers of more than 8 books. a year 
in Israel and in European countries 
% 
who read one the readers if more 
book in the last than 8 books a year 
year 
% among the % o/all 
entire population readers 
Israel 77 42 55 
France . 56 33 59 
England 63 39 6, 
Italy 24 9 38 
'West Germany· 5' 17 32 .. 
Switzerland 69 23 33 
Austria 54 '4 26 
Denmark 67 39 58 
Holland 66 35 53 
Belgium 4' 21 49 
Portugal 28 
'5 53 
21 One of the great 'natural resources' of first-generation Israelis (their 
multi-linguality) is not being passed on to the next generation. 
22 This psychological struggle, and particularly the anguish over making 
war, is one of the great problems of Israeli intellectuals. This echoes Amos 
Elon's discussion, op. cit. 
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